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MEDICINAL MARIJUANA AND PALLIATIVE 
CARE: CARVING A LIBERTY INTEREST OUT OF 
THE GLUCKSBERG FRAMEWORK 
Adam Hyatt*
INTRODUCTION 
 
On August 15, 2002, Butte County deputy sheriffs and federal agents 
from the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”) arrived at Diane 
Monson’s house with a search warrant and discovered six cannabis plants.1  
The deputies determined that Monson was a licensed user of medicinal 
marijuana, and thus her use of the cannabis plants was lawful pursuant to 
California’s Compassionate Use Act of 1996,2 which protects from 
criminal prosecution “patients and their primary caregivers who obtain and 
use marijuana for medical purposes upon the recommendation of a 
physician.”3  Following a three-hour standoff, however, the DEA agents 
seized and destroyed Monson’s cannabis plants.4
The DEA’s seizure was problematic for Monson because she suffers 
 
 
* J.D. candidate, 2007, Fordham University School of Law.  Special thanks to Professor 
Tracy Higgins for her ongoing advice. 
       1. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2200 (2005).  Cannabis plants may be processed 
into marijuana, which is also commonly referred to as pot, weed, reefer, grass, etc.  See Drug 
Enforcement Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Drugs of Abuse (2005), 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/abuse/7-pot.htm (last visited Sept. 13, 2006). 
 2. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2198.  California is one of nine states that have permitted the 
use of medicinal marijuana. The other states are Alaska, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, Nevada, 
Oregon, Vermont, and Washington.  See STATE POLICIES DEP’T, MARIJUANA POLICY 
PROJECT, STATE-BY-STATE MEDICAL MARIJUANA LAWS: HOW TO REMOVE THE THREAT OF 
ARREST 10 (2004), available at http://oldsite.mpp.org/pdf/sbs_report_2004.pdf.  
 3. Compassionate Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(B) (West 
1996). The purpose of the Act is 
[t]o ensure that seriously ill Californians have the right to obtain and use 
marijuana for medical purposes where that medical use is deemed appropriate and 
has been recommended by a physician who has determined that the person’s 
health would benefit from the use of marijuana in the treatment of cancer, 
anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any 
other illness for which marijuana provides relief.   
Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A). 
 4. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2200. 
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from a degenerative disease of the spine, which causes her “severe, chronic 
back pain and constant painful muscle spasms.”5  The intensity of her pain 
is such that she is unable to work or sit down, and thus she is limited to 
lying down.6  Under the care of a Board-certified physician, Monson has 
tried an array of prescription drugs, including muscle relaxants and anti-
inflammatories, but each has been ineffective as a painkiller or has 
produced extreme side effects.7  Medicinal marijuana, on the other hand, 
significantly alleviates Monson’s pain and eradicates her muscle spasms 
almost entirely.8  Accordingly, her physician has concluded that medical 
marijuana is the sine qua non of a successful treatment of her pain and 
suffering.9
Angel Raich is also afflicted with serious medical problems and uses 
marijuana for medical purposes pursuant to the recommendation of her 
physician.
 
10  Prior to the DEA’s raid of Monson’s home, Raich had 
enjoyed protection regarding her use of medicinal marijuana under the 
Compassionate Use Act.11  Raich’s ailments are both life-threatening and 
painful.12  In 1996, she became paralyzed and was restricted to a 
wheelchair.13  Raich’s physician had attempted to treat her with an array of 
medications, but all proved to be ineffective or caused extreme and 
“unacceptable” side effects.14  When her physician told her that 
conventional medicine would not help, Raich attempted suicide.15  
Subsequently, her physician recommended that she use medicinal 
marijuana, which significantly improved her medical condition and enabled 
her to be more active.16
 
 5. Brief for the Respondents at 10, Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2004) (No. 03-
1454),  2004 WL 2308766. 
  Accordingly, her physician concluded that there is 
no legal alternative to medical marijuana, and that without it her body 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id.  
 8. Id. at 6. 
 9. Id.  
 10. Id. at 4-5. 
 11. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2199-2200. 
 12. Brief for the Respondents, supra note 5, at 12.  Her medical conditions include life-
threatening weight loss, nausea, severe chronic pain (from scoliosis, temporomandibular 
joint dysfunction and bruxism, endometriosis, headaches, rotator cuff syndrome, and uterine 
fibroid tumor causing severe dysmenorrheal), an episode of paralysis, post-traumatic stress 
disorder, non-epileptic seizures, fibromyalgia, an inoperable brain tumor, multiple chemical 
sensitivities, allergies, and asthma.  Id. 
 13. Id. at 5. 
 14. Id. at 5-6. 
 15. Id. at 5. 
 16. Id.  
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would deteriorate, hastening her death.17
Subsequent to the DEA’s seizure of Monson’s cannabis plants, Monson 
and Raich brought suit against the United States Attorney General
 
18 and the 
DEA, seeking to enjoin the federal government from enforcing the 
Controlled Substances Act (“CSA”),19 which makes it unlawful to 
manufacture, distribute, dispense, or possess marijuana, and does not 
recognize an exception for medical use.20  In their complaint, Monson and 
Raich argued that the CSA, as applied to them, violated the Commerce 
Clause, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, the Ninth 
Amendment, the Tenth Amendment, and the doctrine of medical 
necessity.21
The United States District Court for the Northern District of California 
disagreed and denied plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction.  The 
court found that the government’s interest
 
22 “wane[d] in comparison with 
the public interests enumerated by plaintiffs and by the harm that they 
would suffer if denied medical marijuana,”23 but nonetheless concluded 
that plaintiffs were not entitled to legal relief because they failed to 
establish a likelihood of success on the merits.24
On appeal, a divided Ninth Circuit panel reversed and ordered the 
district court to enter the preliminary injunction.
 
25  The court held that 
plaintiff-appellants had demonstrated a likelihood of success based on their 
Commerce Clause argument.26
 
 17. Id. 
  The court also found that Monson and 
 18. At the time the action was brought, John Ashcroft was the Attorney General.  By the 
time the case reached the Supreme Court, Alberto R. Gonzales had become Attorney 
General. 
 19. Controlled Substances Act, Pub. L. No. 91-513, 84 Stat. 1242 (1970) (codified in 
scattered sections of 21 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 20. Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C.A §§ 823, 841(a)(1) (West 2006).  The CSA 
places restrictions on controlled substances based on the schedule under which a particular 
drug is categorized.  Because a Schedule I drug, such as marijuana, is deemed to have “a 
high potential for abuse” and “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the United 
States,” the only available exception for its legal use exists for government-approved 
research projects.  Id. §§ 812(b)(1)(A)-(C), 823(f) (West 2006); United States v. Oakland 
Cannabis Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 490 (2001). 
 21. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2200 (2005). 
 22. More specifically, this governmental interest is the presumption of constitutional 
validity of congressional legislation and the regulation of medicine by the FDA.  Raich v. 
Ashcroft, 248 F. Supp. 2d 918, 931 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. 
 25. Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222, 1235 (9th Cir. 2003). 
 26. Id. at 1227. 
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Raich would endure “significant hardship[s]”27 if denied the injunction and 
that the government’s interests were “weak in comparison to the real 
medical emergency facing” plaintiffs,28
In Gonzales v. Raich,
 but did not reach the substantive 
due process claim or the medical necessity defense. 
29 which largely dealt with the issue of federalism, 
the Supreme Court vacated the Ninth Circuit’s judgment and held that the 
CSA was not an unconstitutional exercise of the Commerce Clause as 
applied to the plaintiff-respondents.30  Because the Ninth Circuit did not 
reach respondents’ substantive due process claim or medical necessity 
defense, the Court remanded the case to determine whether Monson and 
Raich could succeed on these other avenues for judicial relief.31
This Comment will focus only on the substantive due process claim 
available to the plaintiffs on remand.
 
32  More specifically, this Comment 
will assess whether there is a right to palliative care.  In Washington v. 
Glucksberg,33 which dealt with the right to assisted suicide, five Justices34
A recent Harvard Law Review note
 
suggested that there may be a liberty interest in avoiding or mitigating 
pain—even if it hastens death.  Accordingly, the facts of Raich fit squarely 
within the fundamental liberty interest question addressed in Glucksberg, 
albeit with an additional hurdle over a statute illegalizing marijuana that is 
backed by significant policy concerns. 
35 argued that “a law completely 
banning the use of marijuana will, as applied to some patients, infringe 
upon an array of fundamental rights, and that substantive due process 
obliges” the courts to apply strict scrutiny to such a law.36
 
 27. It is relevant to note that the government did not dispute this.  See id. at 1234. 
  The Comment 
does not, however, assert that there is indeed a right to use last-resort 
medical marijuana, but rather examines the burdens that the absolute anti-
 28. Id. at 1235. 
 29. 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005). 
 30. Id. at 2215. 
 31. Id. 
 32. For an interesting analysis of the medical necessity defense, see Andrew J. LeVay, 
Urgent Compassion: Medical Marijuana, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Medical 
Necessity Defense, 41 B.C. L. REV. 699 (2000).  See also United States v. Oakland Cannabis 
Buyers’ Coop., 532 U.S. 483 (2001) (holding that medical necessity is not a defense to 
manufacturing and distributing marijuana). 
 33. 521 U.S. 702 (1997). 
 34. Justices O’Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, Stevens, and Souter all filed concurring 
opinions. 
 35. Note, Last Resorts and Fundamental Rights: The Substantive Due Process 
Implications of Prohibitions on Medical Marijuana, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1985 (2005) 
[hereinafter Last Resorts].  
 36. Id. at 1985. 
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marijuana law has on “an array of fundamental rights rooted in both the 
traditional37 and the autonomy38 theories of substantive due process.”39  It 
goes only so far as to say that such a law “make[s] it substantially more 
difficult to pursue these broader values by making it completely impossible 
for patients to exercise their narrower fundamental rights,” and ends the 
analysis at the strict scrutiny stage.40
This Comment goes a step further by arguing that, in view of the Court’s 
precedents, there is a right, subject to limitations, to use last-resort medical 
marijuana.  Part II examines substantive due process generally, as well as 
the precedent relating to medical decision-making.  This Part primarily 
focuses on locating the right to palliative care, which was contemplated in 
Glucksberg, and discusses how medicinal marijuana fits within that right.  
Part III argues that there is indeed a fundamental right to palliative care and 
assesses whether an absolute anti-marijuana law burdens this right to the 
extent that the law is unconstitutional as applied to other cases.  By 
analyzing a range of different factual scenarios, this Part constructs a 
framework to test the point at which the fundamental right is limited by 
strict scrutiny balancing.  Part III concludes by considering the future of the 
medical decision-making spectrum of liberty interests articulated in 
Glucksberg. 
 
 
I. MEDICINAL MARIJUANA & THE ROAD TO PALLIATIVE CARE AS A 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
This Part works through the doctrine of substantive due process in the 
context of medical decision-making.  In particular, this Part reconstructs 
the framework established in Glucksberg and suggests that the Court in 
Raich is headed in a direction as to preserve a fundamental right to 
palliative care that protects use of medicinal marijuana. 
A. Modern Substantive Due Process Jurisprudence 
Modern substantive due process precedent “forbids the government to 
infringe upon certain ‘fundamental’ liberty interests [protected by 
Fourteenth Amendment] at all . . . unless the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”41
 
 37. See infra notes 
  The Supreme Court has 
45-47 and accompanying text. 
 38. See infra notes 48-50 and accompanying text. 
 39. Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 2006. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 302 (1993).  This reflects the language of the strict 
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been cautious, however, when confronted with an opportunity to “expand 
the concept of substantive due process because guideposts for responsible 
decisionmaking in this uncharted area are scarce and open-ended.”42  
Accordingly, to “break new ground”43 within the doctrine, the Court has 
required the claimed liberty to be fundamental.44
The traditional approach,
 
45 articulated in Glucksberg, characterizes a 
right as fundamental when it is “deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and 
tradition . . . and . . . implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, such that 
neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.”46  
Furthermore, “a careful description of the asserted right or liberty” is 
necessary.47
Recently, in Lawrence v. Texas,
 
48 the Court recognized a second vehicle 
for finding fundamental rights.  This approach is premised on the notion of 
autonomy49 and “emphasizes self-definition as the core of constitutionally 
protected liberty.”50
Although both approaches are plausible, this Comment suggests that the 
right to palliative care fits within the Glucksberg paradigm.  At the same 
time, however, because medical decision-making is inherently related to 
individual choice, discussion of personal autonomy is inevitable. 
 
 
B. Medical Decision-Making & the Right to Refuse Treatment 
The Supreme Court considered the notion of fundamental rights in the 
medical decision-making context as early as the turn of the twentieth 
century when it decided Jacobson v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts.51
 
scrutiny balancing test.  When a right is not deemed fundamental, the state’s action merely 
needs to be rationally related to a legitimate government interest.  See Washington v. 
Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 728 (1997). 
  
In Jacobson, a criminal defendant argued that a state statute infringed upon 
 42. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 720 (quoting Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 125 
(1992)). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1986. 
 45. See Robert C. Post, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term—Foreword: Fashioning the 
Legal Constitution: Culture, Courts, and Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 89 (2003). 
 46. Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1986 (quoting Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721 (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
 47. Id. 
 48. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 49. See Post, supra note 45, at 97. 
 50. Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1987. 
 51. 197 U.S. 11 (1905). 
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his liberty by subjecting him to punishment for refusing to submit to a 
compulsory vaccination.52  The Court rejected the defendant’s assertion 
and upheld the statute because the state legislature passed it as a public 
safety measure designed to stop the spread of disease.53  The Court 
concluded that the Constitution “does not import an absolute right in each 
person to be . . . wholly freed from restraint” and that “[t]here are manifold 
restraints to which every person is necessarily subject for the common 
good.”54
Eighty-five years later, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of the right 
to refuse medical treatment in Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of 
Health.
 
55  Using the logic of Jacobson, the Court concluded, “a competent 
person has a constitutionally protected liberty interest in refusing unwanted 
medical treatment.”56  This notion was premised on the common-law 
informed consent rule, which supported the proposition that “even the 
touching of one person by another without consent and without legal 
justification was a battery.”57  The Court noted, however, that locating a 
fundamental right is merely the first step because ascertaining whether 
one’s substantive due process has been violated then requires balancing 
that fundamental right against the corresponding state interest.58  In this 
case, the Court found that the liberty interest outweighed any state interest, 
and thus “assume[d]” a competent person has “a constitutionally protected 
right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition.”59
Embedded in this right to refuse treatment is the notion of autonomy in 
 
 
 52. Id. at 26. 
 53. Id. at 27. 
 54. Id. at 26.  The idea of the “common good” (in this case, stopping spread of disease) 
is equivalent to the “compelling state interest language” in modern substantive due process 
doctrine.  Accordingly, it can be said that there was indeed a liberty interest in refusing 
medical treatment, but it was not strong enough to survive strict scrutiny.  In other words, 
Jacobson turned on the compelling state interest prong of the test, rather than the 
“fundamental liberty” prong of the test.  Id. 
 55. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).  The Court focused on this right in the context of both 
mentally competent and mentally incompetent people.  This Note does not consider the 
rights of mentally incompetent people, nor the evidentiary requirements necessary to 
terminate life support. 
 56. Id. at 278.  At this time, however, the Court did not articulate a level of scrutiny or 
define this right as “fundamental.”  The Court later used this language in Glucksberg.  See 
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 724 (1997). 
 57. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 269. 
 58. Id. at 279. 
 59. Id.  Five justices expressly asserted that this includes the right to refuse food and 
water to bring about death.  For example, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan 
contended there is “a fundamental right to be free of unwanted artificial nutrition and 
hydration, which . . . is not outweighed by any interests of the State . . . .”  Id. at 302 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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medical decision-making, or more simply, the right “to choose effective 
medical treatment pursuant to a doctor’s recommendation.”60  Accordingly, 
as Justice O’Connor asserted in her Cruzan concurrence, “[b]ecause our 
notions of liberty are inextricably entwined with our idea of physical 
freedom and self-determination, the Court has often deemed state 
incursions into the body repugnant to the interests protected by the Due 
Process Clause.”61  In the context of a competent terminally ill patient then, 
requiring life support or other forced medical treatment would “burden that 
individual’s liberty interests as much as any state coercion.”62
Of course, the holding in Cruzan cannot be directly applied to the facts 
of Raich because the former concerns the right to refuse treatment, while 
the case at bar concerns obtaining treatment.
 
63  Nonetheless, because both 
cases fall under the broad umbrella of medical decision-making while 
under the care of a physician, it may be logical that the Due Process Clause 
also protects the right to palliative care even if such care hastens death.64  
In this case, the Court would be following the autonomy trajectory 
established in Lawrence by emphasizing self-definition as a significant 
source of fundamental rights.65
C. Medical Decision-Making, Physician-Assisted Suicide & the 
Future 
 
Seven years after Cruzan, the Court confronted the controversial issue of 
physician-assisted suicide in Glucksberg.66  The plaintiff-respondents, 
Washington physicians who treated terminally ill patients, sought a 
declaration that Washington’s assisted suicide ban was unconstitutional on 
its face.67  In rejecting respondents’ facial challenge and holding that there 
is no fundamental right to assisted suicide, the Court’s method of 
constitutional interpretation seemed to be evolving as it introduced a more 
pronounced doctrinal test for substantive due process analysis.68
 
 60. Last Resorts, supra note 
  The 
35, at 1995. 
 61. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 62. Id. at 288. 
 63. Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1993. 
 64. See id. at 1995-98.  At the same time, however, the common-law tradition draws a 
line between action and inaction: while touching another without permission is considered 
tortious conduct, failing to rescue another is not.  See generally Jackson v. City of Joliet, 
715 F.2d 1200 (7th Cir. 1983). 
 65. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003). 
 66. The Court decided a companion case, Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793 (1997), at the 
same time. 
 67. See Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 707 (1997). 
 68. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text. 
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Court’s methodology reflected an originalist ideology: it emphasized 
history and legal tradition as the sources of liberties rather than emerging 
norms,69 and defined the asserted right more specifically (i.e. the right to 
physician-assisted suicide instead of the more generally defined right to 
personal autonomy in medical decision-making).70
Although a patient’s decision to request lethal medication can be equated 
to the decision to refuse treatment, the notion of assisted suicide as a 
fundamental right is problematic under the Court’s test because there is no 
legal tradition of condoning suicide.
 
71  In fact, “for over 700 years, the 
Anglo-American common-law tradition has punished or otherwise 
disapproved of both suicide and assisting suicide.”72  Furthermore, anti-
suicide laws are not recent “innovations,” but rather are “longstanding 
expressions of the States’ commitment to the protection and preservation of 
all human life.”73  Accordingly, recognizing assisted suicide as a 
constitutionally protected liberty interest would “reverse centuries of legal 
doctrine and practice, and strike down the considered policy choice of 
almost every State.”74
Glucksberg repudiates or limits the notion that narrowly defined rights 
pertaining to medical decision-making are primarily established under a 
broad personal autonomy justification.
 
75  Although self-determination and 
physical control over one’s body are relevant to the inquiry, those interests 
are trumped by history and legal tradition.  Thus, the right to refuse 
treatment assumed in Cruzan “was not simply deduced from abstract 
concepts of personal autonomy,” but rather “[g]iven the common-law rule 
that forced medication was a battery, and the long legal tradition protecting 
the decision to refuse unwanted medical treatment, [the Court’s] 
assumption was entirely consistent with this Nation’s history and 
constitutional traditions.”76  Assisted suicide, on the other hand, though a 
similarly personal decision, contradicts the legal tradition and is thus 
outside the gamut of constitutionally protected liberties.77
Because the Court concluded that physician-assisted suicide was not a 
fundamental right, Washington’s anti-suicide law merely had to survive 
 
 
 69. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 705. 
 70. See id. at 710. 
 71. See id.  
 72. Id. at 711. 
 73. Id. at 710. 
 74. Id. at 723. 
 75. See id. at 727. 
 76. Id. at 725. 
 77. Id. 
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rational basis review.78  In this case, the State easily satisfied this 
requirement with a plethora of legitimate government interests in banning 
assisted suicide, including the preservation of human life,79 combating 
suicide as a disease,80 protecting the integrity of the medical profession,81 
protecting vulnerable groups,82 and avoiding a slippery slope that could 
lead to voluntary or involuntary euthanasia.83  Accordingly, the Court 
upheld Washington’s statute, but also left the door open in the legislative 
arena for the assisted suicide debate to continue.84
Although the law prevents facial challenges to the anti-suicide law, the 
concurrences of five Justices left open the possibility of challenges relating 
to a scenario in which a patient is restricted from obtaining palliative 
care.
 
85  In particular, “a patient who is suffering from a terminal illness and 
who is experiencing great pain [should face] no legal barriers to obtaining 
medication, from qualified physicians, to alleviate that suffering, even to 
the point of causing unconsciousness and hastening death.”86  The Justices 
also suggested that an as-applied challenge may also succeed when a 
patient’s pain is so severe that it cannot be alleviated by medication.87  This 
liberty interest is related not only to avoiding pain, but also to controlling 
the end of one’s life with dignity.88
 
 78. Id. at 728. 
  In totality then, the Glucksberg 
 79. This is the same “unqualified interest” at the core of homicide laws.  Id. 
 80. Suicide is a public-health problem that needs to be meticulously studied and treated.  
Id. at 730. 
 81. Id. at 731. 
 82. The concern is that the poor, elderly, and disabled could be coerced into consenting 
to assisted suicide toward the end of life.  See id. at 731-32.  This protection is also 
necessary because assisted suicide could denigrate the notion that the disabled and 
terminally ill can lead valuable lives.  Id. at 732. 
 83. See id. at 732-33. 
 84. Id. at 735.  Practically, this meant that assisted suicide was left to the political 
process of each state.  Accordingly, Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 127.800-127.890 (West 2006), which legalized physician-assisted suicide subject to 
certain limitations, remained good law.  In fact, several months after Glucksberg was 
decided, the Oregon law withstood a ballot measure to repeal it.  Gonzales v. Oregon, 126 S. 
Ct. 904, 911 (2006).  The Act then faced and withstood a challenge by the Attorney General.  
Id. at 925-26.  The case, one of the first heard by the newly composed Roberts Court, turned 
on an issue of federal administrative law.  Linda Greenhouse, Justices Explore U.S. 
Authority Over States on Assisted Suicide, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2005, at A1. 
 85. See Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 736 (O’Connor, J., concurring); id. at 738 (Stevens, J., 
concurring in the judgment); id. at 752 (Souter, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 778 
(joint opinion of O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ.); id. at 789 (Ginsburg, J., concurring 
in the judgment); id. (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 86. Id. at 736-37 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 87. Id. at 745 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 88. Id. 
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concurrences represent the notion that there is a fundamental right to 
palliative care.  Furthermore, they suggest that this liberty interest may 
outweigh state interests, such as those articulated in Glucksberg, and 
therefore survive strict scrutiny, even if the practical result is permitting 
assisted suicide in limited situations.89
After Glucksberg, it became clear that the Court had created a 
framework for analyzing a range of fundamental rights relating to medical 
decision-making.  On one end of the spectrum is the right to refuse 
treatment, even if such a decision inevitably would lead to death.
 
90  On the 
other end of the spectrum are two categories relating to suicide, which of 
course includes physician-assisted suicide.  The outermost category is the 
decision to commit suicide when death is not imminent.91  A less extreme 
category is the decision to commit suicide when death is imminent and the 
end of life is physically painful.  This category, which falls between the 
right to refuse treatment and the right to suicide at will, infuses notions of 
death with dignity and self-definition during the last days of life by 
controlling the manner of death.  The Court has drawn the line between the 
right to refuse treatment and the right to commit suicide, but has signaled 
openness to hearing an as-applied challenge in which the line could be 
redrawn to define a right to assisted suicide as fundamental in very limited 
circumstances.92
In the center of the spectrum is the right to palliative care even if such 
care hastens death.  Whether the Court will deem this a fundamental right 
is difficult to predict.  On one hand, using medication prescribed by a 
physician seems similar to refusing medical treatment in that it is a medical 
decision over which the individual has autonomy.  At the same time, the 
physician plays a more affirmative role by recommending treatment, which 
is closer to the administration of lethal drugs in assisted suicide.  
Accordingly, the right to palliative care presents a tension that the Court 
has not yet had a chance to resolve.  Because Raich is not a case about 
assisted suicide, however, it is not clear whether it fits squarely within the 
Glucksberg scenario.  On the other hand, the liberty interests of Monson 
and Raich clearly parallel those at issue in Glucksberg. 
 
 
 89. See generally Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1993-95. 
 90. See supra Part I.B.  Tied to this category, but moving more to the middle, is the 
decision to discontinue treatment, which relates more to incompetent adults and is thus 
outside the scope of this Note.  See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text. 
 91. One example of a situation where death is not imminent is if the individual has a 
severe physical disability or depression. 
 92. Whether this would survive strict scrutiny, however, is another issue entirely. 
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D. The Marijuana Curveball 
Raich is further complicated by the fact that the case involves marijuana, 
an illegal drug under the CSA.  First, it is problematic to classify marijuana 
as a form of palliative care, since there is tremendous disagreement as to 
whether the substance has any therapeutic value.  Second, because of its 
illegality, marijuana adds an extra hurdle in the substantive due process 
analysis. 
1. The Marijuana Efficacy Issue 
As Professor Tatiana Shohov points out, the question of whether 
marijuana has therapeutic use for patients with conditions ranging from 
migraines to terminal illnesses has been a topic of recent debate.93  Less 
controversial, however, is the notion that marijuana has both short- and 
long-term adverse effects on the brain, the heart, the lungs, the immune 
system, and on learning and social behavior.94  Notwithstanding its adverse 
effects, marijuana, according to Shohov, has medicinal value.  Shohov 
provides scientific evidence proving that marijuana can provide relief from 
nausea and increase appetite, reduce intraocular pressure, reduce muscle 
spasms, and provide relief from chronic pain: it can thus treat symptoms of 
cancer, AIDS, and multiple sclerosis.95  This evidence has also entered the 
legal arena and has given credibility to the great “number of health care 
professionals and organizations [that] have concluded that the use of 
marijuana may be appropriate for a small class of patients who do not 
respond well to, or do not tolerate, available prescription drugs.”96
On the other side of the controversy, the Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”), which assesses the safety and effectiveness of drugs, has not 
found a medicinal use for marijuana.
 
97
 
 93. See generally MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA: POLICY, REGULATORY AND LEGAL 
ISSUES (Tatiana Shohov ed., 2003). 
  Similarly, Congress determined 
 94. Id. at 3-8. 
 95. Id. at 11, 23-39. 
 96. Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 640-41 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., concurring).  
For more sources that conclude marijuana has medical use, see Marihuana Medical Access 
Regulations, SOR/2001-227 (Can.), available at http://www.canlii.org/ca/regu/sor2001-
227/; Select Committee On Science & Technology, Cannabis: The Scientific and Medical 
Evidence, 1997-8, H.L. 151-1, at § 8.2, available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199798/ldselect/ldsctech/151/15101.htm; In re 
Marijuana Rescheduling Petition, No. 86-22 (Drug Enforcement Admin. Sept. 6, 1988); 
INST. OF MED., MARIJUANA AND MEDICINE: ASSESSING THE SCIENCE BASE (Janet E. Joy et al. 
eds., 1999), available at http://www.nap.edu/books/0309071550/html.  
 97. MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA, supra note 93, at 79.  For an article on the FDA’s 
regulation of pain management drugs, see Lars Noah, Challenges in the Federal Regulation 
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that marijuana has “no currently accepted medical use in treatment in the 
United States.”98
Putting this debate aside, the empirical evidence admitted at trial in 
Raich suggests, at the very least, that medicinal marijuana has therapeutic 
value for both Monson and Raich.
 
99  Furthermore, both the district court 
and the Ninth Circuit found that traditional medicine failed to help the 
plaintiffs and that restricted access to marijuana would be unduly 
burdensome.100  Even the Supreme Court recognized that “despite a 
congressional finding to the contrary, marijuana does have valid 
therapeutic purposes.”101
2. The Illegality Hurdle 
 Accordingly, for the purposes of substantive due 
process analysis, this Comment will assume arguendo that marijuana has 
therapeutic value. 
Marijuana’s illegality under the CSA may create a problem in locating a 
fundamental right.  Of course, this depends entirely on whether the right is 
framed at a broad or specific level of generality.102  At a specific level of 
generality (i.e. the right to use medicinal marijuana), finding a fundamental 
right would be unlikely given the Nation’s history and legal tradition.  
Thus, rational basis review would apply.103  A recent Harvard Law Review 
note points out, however, “the Court must not take such a myopic view of 
the claimed right that it loses the sight of the values at stake.”104  
Accordingly, defining the right in Raich narrowly as the right to use 
medicinal marijuana is analogous to the error committed by the Bowers v. 
Hardwick105 Court in defining the claimed right as the right to engage in 
homosexual sodomy.106  That is, “[t]he mistake lies in viewing the claimed 
right as identical to the conduct that the law prohibits,” which in turn 
ignores significant values underlying the claimed right.107  At a broad level 
of generality, however, there is concern that “the scope of substantive due 
process becomes limitless.”108
 
of Pain Management Technologies, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 55 (2003). 
  This would preclude the right from being 
 98. 21 U.S.C.A. § 812(b)(1)(B) (West 2006). 
 99. See supra notes 5-17 and accompanying text. 
 100. See supra notes 22-28 and accompanying text. 
 101. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005). 
 102. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 103. Id. at 570 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 104. Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1988. 
 105. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 106. See Last Resorts, supra note 35, at 1988. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
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framed as one of personal autonomy in medical decision-making.109
If the right is properly framed as the right to palliative care, the legal 
status of marijuana enters the analysis at the point of determining whether 
the state interest is compelling.  The government has an undeniable interest 
in eradicating drugs from society, which is highlighted by codified anti-
drug policy in the CSA.
  
Framing it as a right to palliative care, then, is neither too broad nor too 
narrow, and seems to be most consistent with Lawrence, Cruzan, and the 
concurrences of Glucksberg. 
110  This governmental interest dates back to 1969 
when President Richard Nixon launched a national “war on drugs.”111  
Thereafter, Congress passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention 
and Control Act of 1970,112 which includes the CSA within Title II.  In 
passing the Act, Congress’s objectives were “to conquer drug abuse and to 
control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled substances.”113  
In particular, Congress sought to “prevent diversion [of legitimate drugs] 
into illegal channels, and strengthen law enforcement tools against the 
traffic of illicit drugs.”114
More specifically, marijuana is classified as a Schedule I drug, in part 
because of its high potential for abuse.
 
115  Illustrative of this is the fact that 
marijuana is used more in the United States than any other illegal drug, 
with over twelve million Americans, age twelve and over, using the drug at 
least once a month in 2001.116  This statistic is troubling because of the 
scientific evidence documenting the health risks associated with the use of 
marijuana.117
 
 109. See id. at 1988-89. 
  Furthermore, many scientists adhere to the notion that 
marijuana is a gateway drug that may lead to the use of more dangerous 
 110. Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 236 (1970). 
 111. Gonzales v. Raich, 125 S. Ct. 2195, 2201 (2005); see also DAVID F. MUSTO & 
PAMELA KORSMEYER, THE QUEST FOR DRUG CONTROL 60 (2002). 
 112. 84 Stat. 1236.  Prior to that, Congress passed legislation, such as the Harrison 
Narcotics Act of 1914, 38 Stat. 785 (repealed 1970), and the Marihuana Tax Act of 1957, 
Pub. L. No. 75-238, 50 Stat. 551 (repealed 1970), which did not illegalize marijuana but 
instead established harsh regulations that had the practical effect of curtailing the market for 
marijuana.  Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2202. 
 113. Raich, 125 S. Ct. at 2203. 
 114. Id. at 2201. 
 115. Id. at 2204. 
 116. MEDICAL USE OF MARIJUANA, supra note 93, at 1-2. 
 117. Id. at 42.  The long-term risks associated with chronic use include damage to the 
respiratory system, cardiovascular system, the immune system, and the reproductive system.  
Id.  In addition, there are many possible short-term complications users of marijuana may 
confront.  The number of hospital emergency room visits induced by or relating to the use of 
marijuana increased fifteen percent from 96,426 in 2000 to 110,512 in 2001.  Id. at 2. 
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substances.118
Accordingly, it is clear that the government has an interest in curtailing 
the use of marijuana in the United States.  Because the medication in this 
case is illegal, Raich is an excellent test case for the right to palliative care.  
In balancing the liberty interest against the government’s interest in this 
case, it is significant to note that the latter remains fixed.  Conversely, one 
individual claiming the right to palliative care might have a stronger liberty 
interest than another.  This notion comes to fruition in Raich because 
Monson’s interest is alleviating severe pain, while Raich’s interest is not 
only treating her pain but also staying alive.  Because legislation such as 
the Compassionate Use Act permitted the use of marijuana for medicinal 
purposes for an array of medical conditions, a spectrum of liberty interests 
is necessary to determine where to draw the line at the strict scrutiny 
balancing stage—thereby distinguishing constitutional and unconstitutional 
government intrusion. 
 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION FOR MEDICINAL MARIJUANA: 
LIMITED USES SUBSUMED BY THE RIGHT TO PALLIATIVE CARE 
This Part contends that the Glucksberg framework applies to the liberty 
interest asserted by plaintiffs in Raich.  Moreover, in light of the Court’s 
substantive due process precedents in the medical decision-making context, 
this Part argues that the use of marijuana for medical purposes is within a 
sphere of constitutional protection, subject to limitations, when it falls 
within the right to palliative care.  This section suggests an approach to 
evaluating individual circumstances with a view to distinguishing palliative 
care from physician-assisted suicide, which the Court in Glucksberg 
declined to include within the scope of individual liberty protected by the 
Constitution. 
A. Applying Glucksberg To Raich 
In the broadest sense, the Glucksberg framework applies to the facts of 
Raich because of the assertion of a liberty interest in the medical decision-
making context.  The cases clearly differ, however, in that the liberty 
interest at issue in Glucksberg was physician-assisted suicide, while the 
plaintiffs in Raich are seeking to protect their ability to receive palliative 
care.  Furthermore, because the Court emphasizes an originalist ideology 
when locating rights, the liberty interests asserted in these cases conflict.  
That is, the United States clearly does not have a history or legal tradition 
 
 118. Id. at 42. 
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of condoning suicide.119  On the other hand, the common law protected 
individuals from bodily encroachment by others because of notions of 
personal autonomy.120  The Court in Cruzan pointed to this tradition as the 
justification for a right to refuse treatment, even if the underlying 
motivation of the decision was to cause death.121  An argument can be 
made that opting for lethal medication is analogous to refusing treatment 
because both lead to death, but there is a significant distinction between the 
two options.  In refusing treatment, the underlying objective may be to die, 
but the decision is still a step removed from the result that will ultimately 
occur.122
The right to palliative care should be viewed as an extension of this 
logic.  Palliative medication is more akin to refusing treatment than opting 
for physician-assisted suicide, because there is still a gap between the 
decision to use a pain-alleviating medication that will hasten death and 
death itself.  Ergo, in opting for palliative care, only the objective to lessen 
pain may be assumed.  Furthermore, similar to the right to refuse treatment, 
the decision to choose a treatment is both supported by tradition and 
notions of personal autonomy.  When a competent adult seeks medical 
advice for a particular illness or condition, although the physician may 
recommend various treatments and discuss the possible outcomes and side 
effects, ultimately the individual is autonomous in selecting the course of 
action.  Out of traditional respect for the doctor-patient relationship, the 
government stays outside the walls of the physician’s office.
  Conversely, in the case of physician-assisted suicide, the decision 
is directly linked to the result. 
123  This is not 
to say that the physician’s office is beyond the law; clearly such a rationale 
would be a slippery slope in the same manner that an absolute right to 
privacy in the bedroom would have been in Lawrence.  Rather, absent a 
compelling government interest, a government intrusion would offend 
one’s liberty.  Accordingly, the presumption should favor the liberty 
interest of the patient, thereby placing the burden of proving a compelling 
interest on the government at the strict scrutiny balancing stage.124
 
 119. See supra notes 
  When a 
71-74 and accompanying text. 
 120. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 269 (1990). 
 121. See supra notes 56-59 and accompanying text. 
 122. And there may be a significant passage of time between the decision to refuse 
treatment (or food and hydration) and death.  See NAT’L HOSPICE & PALLIATIVE CARE ORG., 
ARTIFICIAL NUTRITION & END-OF-LIFE DECISION MAKING (2005), available at 
http://www.caringinfo.org/files/public/QA_Artificial_Nutrition_booklet.pdf. 
 123. See 98 C.J.S. Witnesses § 341 (2006). 
 124. For example, it should be presumed that an individual who needs to have a cavity 
filled in by a dentist should have the option to undergo the procedure with Novocain.  If the 
government wanted to restrict this option, it would have the burden of proving a compelling 
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treatment is palliative in nature, notions of physical freedom and self-
determination strengthen the individual’s liberty interest.  For the state to 
deny a patient in great pain the ability to ameliorate her condition would be 
an “incursion” just as “repugnant” as forcing treatment upon that patient.125
Although the right to palliative care applies to both plaintiffs, Monson’s 
and Raich’s situations should be viewed as distinct cases at the strict 
scrutiny balancing stage because their liberty interests are different.  
Monson’s liberty interest represents the right to palliative care in the 
manner contemplated by the Glucksberg concurrences.  That is, Monson 
requires medicinal marijuana to treat the severe pain and muscle spasms 
she experiences as symptoms of her degenerative spine condition.
  
Based on these arguments and the concurrences of five justices in 
Glucksberg, it is probable that the Court will determine that the right to 
palliative care is fundamental. 
126  
Because her physician has concluded that medicinal marijuana is the only 
drug that can effectively treat her symptoms, it represents her last resort at 
palliative care.127  Raich’s interest, albeit also partly to ease her physical 
pain and discomfort, is stronger, since her use of medicinal marijuana is 
predominantly for the purpose of preserving her life.  Cannabis is her last 
resort; without it her body would deteriorate, rapidly causing her death.128
Despite this possibility, it seems likely that both Raich and Monson have 
sufficiently strong liberty interests to render the anti-marijuana law 
unconstitutional as applied to them.
  
Accordingly, at the strict scrutiny balancing stage, because the 
government’s interest remains constant, and the outcome turns on the 
strength of the fundamental right, it is possible for the Court to reach a 
favorable result for Raich and an unfavorable result for Monson.  In other 
words, the Court could conclude that Raich’s interest in staying alive 
outweighs the government’s interest in fighting the war on drugs, but that 
Monson’s interest in reducing her pain does not. 
129
 
anti-Novocain interest. 
  But this begs the question: where 
should the line be drawn, separating permissible and impermissible uses of 
medicinal marijuana as a form of palliative care?  After all, the 
Compassionate Use Act bestows the right to obtain and use marijuana for 
medical purposes for “the treatment of cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic 
pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, migraine, or any other illness for which 
 125. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 126. See supra notes 5-9 and accompanying text. 
 127. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 5, at 7. 
 128. See id. at 5. 
 129. See infra Part II.A.1-2. 
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marijuana provides relief.”130
The following spectrum is a range of factual scenarios relating to the use 
of medicinal marijuana, in which the level of constitutional protection 
weakens as the medical condition becomes less “serious.”
  The Act indicates that there are many 
medical uses for marijuana, but surely not all subsets fall into an area of 
constitutional protection.  Consequently, a spectrum clearly establishing a 
limit is necessary to avoid a slippery slope dilemma.  Furthermore, as a 
caveat to constitutional protection, the use of medicinal marijuana should 
be a last resort for treating a particular medical condition.  In other words, a 
plaintiff claiming that the use of medicinal marijuana is constitutionally 
protected shall have the burden of proving that traditional forms of 
medicine have failed and that medical marijuana is the only effective 
treatment.  Furthermore, the plaintiff must have first attempted an 
exhaustive inventory of traditional medications pursuant to the care of a 
physician before turning to marijuana as a last resort. 
131
1. Medical Conditions That Threaten Life 
 
For a patient with a life-threatening medical condition such as Raich, 
medicinal marijuana is not only palliative but actually prevents the body 
from deteriorating.132  In such cases, medical marijuana is used to prolong 
the life of the patient: thus the liberty interest is at the height of 
constitutional protection.  First, from a textual perspective, the right to life 
interest is specifically articulated in both the Declaration of Independence 
and the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the Constitution.133  Second, 
our legal tradition elevates the life interest over all other rights, which is 
most clearly expressed in homicide laws.134
 
 130. Compassionate Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (West 
1996). 
  Third, avoiding death seems 
to represent the apex of personal autonomy because it relates to bodily 
integrity and self-definition.  Finally, the life interest seems to be in accord 
with the substantive due process doctrine.  In Glucksberg, the preservation 
 131. By no means is this a thorough list of the medical conditions that medicinal 
marijuana can treat.  For a more thorough list see AMA Council on Scientific Affairs, 
Medical Marijuana, http://www.ama-
assn.org/ama/pub/category/13625.html#major_proposed_medical_uses (last visited Aug. 31, 
2006). 
 132. This could apply to patients diagnosed with cancer or patients experiencing AIDS 
“wasting.” See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 5, at 5. 
 133. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).  U.S. CONST. amends. V, 
XIV § 1. 
 134. Washington v. Gluckersberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710-11 (1997); James A. Alesandro, 
Physician-Assisted Suicide & New York Law, 57 Alb. L. Rev. 820, 923 (1994). 
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of life was the predominant impetus behind the Court’s holding at both 
stages of the substantive due process inquiry.135  At the liberty interest 
stage, the Court rejected the notion of a fundamental right to assisted 
suicide because “of the States’ [longstanding] commitment to the 
protection and preservation of human life.”136  At the state interest stage, 
the Court similarly found the States’ ban on assisted suicide as rationally 
related to the “unqualified interest in the preservation of human life.”137
2. Medical Conditions Associated With Severe Pain 
  
Accordingly, because patients such as Raich are trying to prolong life, the 
palliative care interest is the exact antithesis of the concerns echoed in 
Glucksberg.  After rejecting a right to physician-assisted suicide on the 
basis of this interest in the preservation of life, to hold that Raich’s liberty 
interest falls short of the government’s interest in curtailing the marijuana 
trade would seemingly conflict with a right enumerated in the Constitution, 
the Nation’s history and legal tradition, notions of personal autonomy, and 
the Court’s precedent. 
Although the right to palliative care is not as strong as an interest in 
preserving life, patients such as Monson, who use medicinal marijuana to 
reduce severe pain, should fall within the sphere of constitutional 
protection.  Monson’s condition restricts her ability to move around, stand, 
or sit, because the intensity of her pain completely incapacitates her.138  In 
other words, her condition has rendered it impossible for her to lead a 
normal life.  When treated with medicinal marijuana, however, her 
symptoms are significantly reduced.139  Accordingly, the anti-marijuana 
law offends her personal autonomy because it impedes both her physical 
freedom and her ability to define herself.  At the strict scrutiny balancing 
stage, this personal autonomy interest outweighs the government’s anti-
drug interest for two reasons.  One, both the short- and long-term health 
risks associated with marijuana are moot because she is already battling a 
condition that is severely worse than the possible conditions she may 
possibly face due to the drug.  Moreover, her physician concluded that 
medicinal marijuana does not cause Monson unacceptable side effects, 
unlike the many other medications she has tried.140
 
 135. See infra Parts II.A.2. 
  Two, it seems 
inequitable for the government to make patients such as Monson martyrs of 
 136. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 711. 
 137. Id. at 728. 
 138. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text. 
 140. See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 5, at 5-6. 
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the government’s perpetual war on drugs.  In other words, the 
government’s interest is just not compelling enough for the absolute anti-
drug law to survive strict scrutiny, as applied to plaintiffs with such 
significant liberty interests at stake. 
Of course, such a holding inevitably creates both institutional concerns 
and a slippery slope problem because there can be no bright line rule to 
distinguish between “severe” pain and “ordinary” pain.  Nevertheless, the 
task of weighing the liberty interest against the government’s interest is not 
unmanageable.141
3. Other Medical Conditions: When Pain Is Not “Severe” 
  Courts should execute a cost-benefit analysis, in which 
the inquiry turns on evidence presented by the plaintiff’s physician.  In 
assessing this evidence, courts should consider factors such as whether the 
pain is chronic or sporadic and whether or not the pain causes physical 
immobility. 
The other medical conditions permitting the use of medicinal marijuana 
under the Compassionate Use Act that are beneath the “severe” pain 
benchmark, such as migraines, glaucoma, and anorexia, are outside the 
scope of constitutional protection.142
Furthermore, with regard to institutional concerns, this seems to be an 
appropriate point to draw the line in order to keep the analysis from 
becoming unwieldy.  For example, if a patient who suffered from migraines 
once a week was deemed to have a liberty interest strong enough to bring 
her use of medicinal marijuana into a sphere of constitutional protection, 
the Court would surely be creating a slippery slope.  This decision would 
open the door for the line to be pushed even further: subsequent plaintiffs 
would claim a similar right to palliative care because of migraines suffered 
monthly, yearly, and so on.  Accordingly, for the doctrine to have any 
value, the line must be drawn clearly below the “severe” pain echelon—
that is, the point at which the pain unduly restricts one from leading a 
  This is not to say that these 
conditions—from which millions of Americans suffer—are not serious, but 
rather that the liberty interests associated with them do not outweigh the 
government’s anti-drug interest.  Although these conditions emphasize 
personal autonomy, they do not reach the point at which the patient’s life is 
completely in the hands of the medical condition, as is the case for 
individuals such as Raich and Monson. 
 
 141. This task is arguably comparable to assessing the amount of pain a plaintiff has 
suffered in order to award monetary damages in a tort action. 
 142. See Compassionate Use Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) 
(West 1996).  Similarly, this excludes the “any other illness for which marijuana provides 
relief” part of the Compassionate Use Act from being constitutionally protected.  Id. 
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normal life. 
B. The Glucksberg Spectrum Of Liberty Interests: Drawing A Line 
That Excludes Physician-Assisted Suicide 
In revisiting the spectrum of liberty interests relating to medical 
decision-making set forth in Glucksberg, it is clear that the right to 
palliative care is fundamental.  The facts of Raich provide the Court with 
an opportunity to articulate the strength of this liberty interest by focusing 
on as-applied challenges to the absolute anti-marijuana law.  And it seems 
that in the cases of Raich and Monson, access to medicinal marijuana as 
integrated within the right to palliative care is sufficiently “fundamental” to 
outweigh the government’s policy objectives that underlie the CSA.  What 
Raich does not do, however, is assess what could be a thin line between 
palliative care hastening death and physician-assisted suicide.  Although 
marijuana poses health risks, this type of drug is not what the authors of the 
Glucksberg concurrences had in mind when they discussed the right to 
palliative care.143  Rather, the five justices were referring to a drug, which 
while lessening the patient’s pain, simultaneously accelerated death.144  
And as previously mentioned, such cases should qualify as a fundamental 
right because the act of administering palliative medication that hastens 
death is a step removed from choosing death itself.145  Moreover, at the end 
of life, the personal autonomy interest increases as notions of self-
determination and dignity become more prevalent.146
A final issue outside the scope of Raich, alluded to in the Glucksberg 
concurrences, is the issue of physician-assisted suicide in a situation in 
which the patient’s pain is so severe that it cannot be alleviated by 
medication.  Recently, this contemplated situation came to fruition at 
Memorial Hospital in New Orleans in the aftermath of Hurricane 
Katrina.
  
147  The hospital’s electricity was shut down, causing the 
temperature to rise inside the hospital and severely ill patients to be 
disconnected from life-sustaining medical equipment.148
 
 143. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 791-92 (1997). 
  After the storm, 
Louisiana’s attorney general launched an investigation into possible mercy 
killings (killing patients that were too sick to survive the hurricane) by 
 144. Id. 
 145. See supra Part II.A. 
 146. See supra Part II.A. 
 147. See Beth Musgrave, 73 Hospital Workers Facing Mercy-Killings Subpoenas, MIAMI 
HERALD, Oct. 28, 2005, at A9. 
 148. Id. 
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doctors and nurses.149  In an extreme context such as this, the question 
should be whether the constitutional limit excluding assisted suicide 
encroaches too far on an individual’s personal autonomy.  While such a 
case would be a difficult decision for the Court to make given its reliance 
on originalist ideology, the Court would not find a right to assisted suicide 
even under such a rare factual scenario.  Ultimately, the Court would fear 
that opening the door just a crack would blur the distinction between what 
is permissible and impermissible under the Constitution.  Moreover, the 
slippery slope concern in finding an assisted-suicide exception is quite 
deleterious to society as a result of the government’s profound interest in 
the preservation of human life, protecting vulnerable groups, and avoiding 
the road to voluntary or involuntary euthanasia.150
 
 
CONCLUSION 
This Comment argues that the right to palliative care is a logical 
outgrowth of Glucksberg in light of both the Court’s originalist approach 
and the emerging emphasis on personal autonomy within substantive due 
process jurisprudence.  For a small number of patients who are terminally 
ill or living with chronic, severe pain, such as Diane Monson and Angel 
Raich, however, the only effective life-sustaining or palliative treatment 
comes in the form of medicinal marijuana.  Despite the illegality of 
marijuana and the government’s corresponding policy, such use of 
medicinal marijuana falls under the umbrella of constitutional protection, 
because the government’s interest in an absolute anti-drug law does not 
outweigh the liberty interest in staying alive or defining one’s own 
existence.  At the same time, access to medicinal marijuana for patients 
with symptoms treatable by the drug is not unqualified, and is limited by 
both the severity of the patient’s condition and proof that traditional forms 
of medicine are ineffective.  Finally, this Comment asserts that despite 
finding a right to palliative care—even if it hastens death—the line should 
be not be extended further to include assisted suicide within the sphere of 
constitutional protection.  This is the case even in extreme circumstances 
due both to compelling government interests and the risk of the doctrine 
becoming unworkable. 
 
 
 149. Id. 
 150. See supra notes 79, 82-83 and accompanying text. 
